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THE RELEASE OF ONE JOINT TORT FEASOR AS A DISCHARGE TO THE
OTHERS.
Under what circumstances the release of one joint tort feasor
will operate as a discharge to the others is a question concern-
ing which the courts of this country are not wholly in accord.
Upon three points there is general agreement: (z) Where
the injured party accepts from one tort feasor a sum in satisfac-
tion of his cause of action, this fact, whether recited in the
release or not, is a complete discharge of those others who are
or might be made parties defendant to the suit for damages.
Brown v. Cambridge, 3 Allen 474; Delong v. Curtis, 35 Hun 94.
(2) In those jurisdictions where sealed instruments possess their
common law character, a release under seal made to one joint
tort feasor releases all. The reason for the rule, as stated in
Ellis v. Esson, 5o Wis. 138, is that "the meaning of such a
release cannot be controlled by parol evidence, and the law
raises a conclusive presumption that it was given in full satisfac-
tion for the injury and for a sufficient consideration. Urton v.
Price, 57 Cal. 270; Rogers v. Cox, 66 N. J. L. 432. (3) A
covenant not to sue one of the joint tort feasors will not release
the others. Bailey v. Berry, 3 Ohio Dec. 483; Snow v. Chandler,
io N. H. 92; Chicago v. Babcock, 143 Ill. 358.
The real question upon which the courts are not agreed is
whether a release of one joint tort feasor independent of the
question of full satisfaction, releases the others. A leading
case supporting the affirmative of this question is Abb v. Railway
Co., 28 Wash. 428. In that case a person injured by a collision
between a passenger train and a street car accepted $30o and a
pass from the street car company and executed a release, both
parties to the transaction regarding this as a partial satisfac-
tion only, but the court held that this release was a bar to an
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action against the steam railway company. In an early
Virginia case. Ruble v. Turner, 2 Hen. & Mun. 38, the court thus
enunciated the rule: "The law says that if one joint tort feasor
be released it shall bar a recovery against all the rest. The
plaintiff can no more change the law, in this particular, by any
subsequent proviso or condition than he could change the course
of descents as prescribed by law." Seither v. Phila. Traction Co.,
125 Pa. 397, is perhaps authority for the above rule. The case
of Turner v. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa 310, may be noted as illustrating
to what extreme it has been carried. In that case a number of
women had made a raid upon the plaintiff's saloon and damaged
his property. Subsequent to this and prior to beginning a suit
for damages, plaintiff married one of the women. The court
held that here was discharge by operation of law, that the inter-
marriage between the plaintiff and one of the tort feasors being
a release to the one was a release to all. There was a dissent-
ing opinion, concurred in by another judge.
In th6 recent case of Robertson v. Trammell, 83 S. W. 258
(Tex.), where the facts were similar to those in Abb v. Railway
Co,, supra, it was held that "where an injured person accepted
money from one of several joint tort feasors and dismissed as to
him, and executed a release to him only, which did not show a
release of the cause of action itself or full satisfaction of the
claim for damages, such release did not discharge the other
joint tort feasors. So in Mail Co. v. Barnes, 79 S. W. 26z,
decided by the Courts of Appeals of Kentucky, it was said:
"It is not the intention of .the law to force people into litigation
and prevent settlements out of court. . . . If ten persons
committed a joint tort and injured a person to the extent of
$x,ooo and nine of them recognized that fact, and were willing
to pay $ioo each for the purpose of remunerating the injured
person, and the tenth man refused to pay his $zoo, according to
the appellant the injured party could not accept the $9oo in part
satisfaction and sue the stubborn tenth man. He would plead
the settlement as a satisfaction and a bar. Such a construction
of the law would be unreasonable and unjust." So in Bloss v.
Plymale, 3 W. Va. 409, the rule laid down in Ruble v. Turner,
supra, was denied and the court held that if damages are satis-
fied in part by payment or compromise with some of the
defendants, plaintiff may still proceed against the others. Sup-
porting this doctrine are the cases of Sloan v. Herrick, 49 Vt.
328, and Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. I.
There is a tendency in some of the courts to allow the inten-
tion of the parties to govern the extent to which a release may
be given effect. Sloan v. Herrick, supra; Ellis v. Esson, 50 Wis.
138; Irvine v. Milbank, i5 Abb. Pr. N. S. 378.
NOTICE AS APPLIED BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE ENCUMBRANCERS OF
PERSONALTY.
The question of necessity of notice, as between successive
encumbrancers of personal property and the debtor, with refer-
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ence to the priority of their several claims is one as to which the
decisions of this country are not in accord. The question first
came up before the English courts in I814 in the case of Cooper
v. Fynmore, 3 Russ. 6o, in which the rule was laid down that
priority in point of time concluded the rights of encumbrancers,
and that the question of notice had no application. Subse-
quently this ruling was reversed, and in x823, in the case ef
Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. z, the present English doctrine was
enunciated-viz., that as against subsequent bona fide assignees
for a valuable consideration a notice to the holder of the legal
title (the debtor, or some person acting or standing in his place
or stead), is absolutely necessary in order to perfect the assign-
ment and render it valid and effectual. This ruling was followed
in the subsequent case of In re Freshfteld's Estate, ix Ch. D. 198,
and in the late case of In re Dallas, L. R. 1904, 2 Ch. 385, where
the question was raised as between the successive encumbrancers
of an expectancy of a legacy under a will, the court holding that,
until administration had, the legal title to such expectancy was
in the administrator and that the priority of the claims of the
several encumbrancers was in the order of their notification to
such administrator, they being bonafide encumbrancers for value
without notice.
The modem English rule has been followed in many of the
courts of our states, including the Federal courts. Clodfelter v. Cox,
I Sneed 330; Bishop v. Hoolmb, io Conn. 446; Ward v. Mrorrison,
25 Vt. 593; Graham Paper'Co. v. Pembroke, 124 Cal. 117; Judson
v. Corcoran, 17 How. 613. Many of the other states, however,
follow the early English doctrine. Muir v. Schneck, 3 Hill 228;
Warren v. Cop elin, 4 Met. (Mass.) 594. Under this ruling, it
would seem that the giving of notice either to the debtor or to
the assignee is entirely unnecessary. But even in these cases,
it is essential that the assignee exercise due diligence in asserting
his claim; otherwise he may forfeit it through negligence. Mfer-
cantile Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, x Gray 75; Fraley's Appeal, 76 Pa. 42.
The practical wisdom of the English rule is clear, for it gives the
means of determining between the conflicting rights, and affords
purchasers of choses in action a security which they cannot
obtain under a different system, short of registration. It is but
just that all transfers of property should be rendered as complete
as the nature of the circumstances will permit. It is clearly the
the duty of an assignee, in order to perfect his assignment,
to give notice to the debtor, for if notice be not given it
enables the original creditor to commit a fraud, by assigning a
second time, when the second assignee, although he may take
the precaution of inquiring of the debtor, cannot ascertain from
him the fact of a previous assignment, it never having been com-
miinicated to him. Under the earlier ruling, it is clear that no
assignment can be taken with safety. The most effective
remedy in these circumstances is to be met in legislation pro-
viding for the registration of conveyances of personalty.
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JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE VALIDITY OF A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE.
The Supreme Court of California in Dobbins v. City of Los
Angeles, 139 Cal. I7M, announced the proposition, "The motives
which induce a legislative body to make a law cannot be consid-
ered in a judicial proceeding in which the validity of the law is
the question involved."
By "legislative body" the court had reference to a municipal
council, the case being one in which it was sought to contest the
validity of a municipal ordinance made for the public health and
safety on the ground that to enforce the ordinance would be to
interfere arbitrarily with property rights guaranteed in the
14 th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
We
are bound to ask ourselves the question whether this declaration
of the California court is the law with respect to municipal coun-
cils. According to the best authorities to be found in the books,
it is not the law. The judicial branch of a state government;
that is, a state court, cannot institute an inquiry into the motives
of a legislature in enacting a state law. By analogy to this rule,
i Dill. Yl. Corp. §3 i, it is true that as a general rule courts will
not inquire into the motives behind municipal ordinances. But,
as is said by the same authority, it will not do to apply the
analogy to its full extent, for municipal bodies have too often
shown themselves capable, like directories of private corporations,
of using their powers fraudulently for their own advantage and to
the advantage of others.
The California court in rendering their decision relied on.
Mkfunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. I3. A careful reading of this case will
show that the principles there enunciated, while applicable to
judicial interference with and inquiry into state enactments, are
not applicable, by reason of the distinction shown above, to cases
of judicial review of municipal ordinances.
As stated, the ordinance contested in Dobbins v. Los Angeles was
one passed under authority of the police power given to the
municipality. It was for the suppression of a gas manufactory,
on the ground that the existence of the gas manufactory was a
menace to the public health and safety. The making of gas,
while in some respects a dangerous trade, is a lawful business.
It is not a nuisance per se. A municipal corporation may by
virtue of police power given to it restrain a lawful business, when
the good of the public demands the restraint, and any damage
resulting thereby to the proprietor of the lawful business or trade
is considered damnum absque injuria, for "saluspopuli sup rema lex est,"
I Dill. f. Corp. §141 et seq. But the weight of authority is to the
effect that the regulations in restraint of a lawful business must
be reasonable. Ex parte Lacey, zo8 Cal. 326; St. Louis v. Howard,
119 Mo. 4x; Phillos v. Denver, 109 Colo. 179. Clearly the regula-
tions must be reviewable, else how can it be ascertained whether
they are reasonable? It has also been held that, a city has no
authority, general or implied, to suppress or confine a lawful
business unless the business be a nuisance per se. Crowley v. West,
52 La. Ann. 527.
COMMENT. 28Y
The case Dobbins v. Los Angeles was carried from the Supreme
Court of California to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The decision of the California court was reversed. 25 Sup. Ct. t8.
In rendering the decision, Mr. Justice Day said, in part, that
every intendment is to be made in favor of the lawfulness of the
exercise of municipal power in making regulations for the public
health and safety, and that it is not the province of the courts
ordinarily to interfere. But that, notwithstanding this, it is now
well settled that municipal by-laws and ordinances are subject to
investigation in the courts with a view to determining whether or
not there has been an unwarranted interference with constitu-
tional rights. Lawton v. Steel, 152 U. S. 133; Holden v. Hardy, z69
U. S. 366.
